This article reviews the role that normative claims about climate justice have played in international climate politics and traces how international society's approach to equity questions has changed between the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015). In an anarchic international environment, international society can be expected to prioritize order over justice, and the interest of the most powerful states over those of the most vulnerable states.
Introduction
Henry Shue has made a seminal contribution to the international debate about climate justice. By distinguishing between 'subsistence emissions' and 'luxury emissions' (Shue, 1992; 1993) , he established the normative principle that emissions from poor countries should be treated differently than those from rich countries. Based on their historical responsibility for climate change and superior economic capacity, industrialised countries are morally obliged to take a lead in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and supporting developing countries with their adaptation costs, mainly through financial and technological transfers. In his engagement with global climate change for well over two decades (Shue, 2014) , Shue has put forward a carefully developed and powerfully argued theory of climate justice that is of direct relevance to the international politics of climate change. His work is located at the point where normative theory intersects with political reality. Unsurprisingly, given the often dismal state of international climate negotiations, Shue's measured tone of abstract normative reasoning has occasionally given way to more strongly worded expressions of frustration and anger, especially when targeted at 'feckless leaders' that fail to provide leadership, most notably in the United States (Shue, 2011) . He is, in the best sense of the word, an engaged normative theorist, an idealist in a world of supposed realists, but fully conscious of the harsh environment that an anarchical international society offers for anyone wishing to translate universal ethical principles into political action.
In this article, I intend to reflect on Shue's argument about the 'unavoidability of justice' (Shue, 1992) from the perspective of International Relations (IR) rather than normative theory. The IR discipline is usually concerned with the 'is' of world politics, not the 'ought', though it should be noted that normative questions about 'how should we act?' are never too far from the surface in the 'practical discourses' that make up IR theorising (Reus-Smith and Snidal, 2008 International relations is often portrayed as a social realm in which anarchy and the need to maintain order take precedence over morality and the desire to achieve global justice. As Hedley Bull put it in his influential framing of the pluralist nature of international society, 'justice … is realisable only in a context of order ' (1977: 86) , but 'international order is preserved by means which systematically affront the most basic and widely agreed principles of international justice ' (1977: 91) . International order in an anarchic environment is maintained by mechanisms (for example diplomacy, balance of power, war) that privilege the mighty at the expense of the weak, and they usually leave little room for the pursuit of higher normative ambitions. To be sure, Bull's justification for the empirical and moral priority of order over justice is rooted in a distinctly minimalist and deeply skeptical approach to theorising international society, one that is strongly coloured by his Cold War experience (Hurrell, 2003: 26) . As such, it may not adequately capture the expansion of human aspiration and solidarity, especially in the post-Cold War era.
However, even those that point to the recent growth of solidarist forms of international cooperation usually concede that this process remains weak and incomplete.
If there are any areas of international life that are particularly open to the influence of normative reasoning, then global environmental politics ought to be one of them. After all, environmental stewardship became a fundamental international norm mainly because of norm entrepreneurship by environmental campaigners, scientists and progressive state leaders (Falkner and Buzan, 2017 Protocol phase but has reverted to a more pluralist and de-centralised approach in the Paris Agreement (Falkner, 2017) . (Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012: 467-8) . By adopting 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' (CBDR), the UNFCCC established differentiation as the core principle for defining how countries ought to reduce emissions and contribute to international climate finance and technology transfer. The firstever climate treaty thus incorporated elements of industrialised countries' historical responsibility and ability to pay into its burden sharing arrangement, though it did not operationalise how common and differentiated responsibilities would be balanced.
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The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC went one step further and established a strict divide between industrialised (Annex I) and developing (non-Annex I) countries, with only the former committing to legally binding and quantified emission reduction targets. In less than ten years of international negotiations, developing countries had thus scored one of their biggest diplomatic victories. They had pushed the mitigation burden entirely onto developed economies while exempting themselves from any emission cuts, at least until the end of the treaty's first commitment period . In this sense, at least, the Kyoto treaty fulfilled Shue's normative principle that poor countries should not be restricted in their ability to increase 'subsistence' emissions as part of their developmental effort.
Other elements of the treaty were more problematic, however. By prioritising climate change mitigation over adaptation, Kyoto did not do enough to prevent significant losses for the most vulnerable countries (Gardiner, 2011) ; its provisions on capacity building and technology transfer remained underdeveloped (Okereke and Coventry, 2016: 838) ; and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a flexibility instrument that allows developed countries to fund emission reduction projects in developing countries and in exchange claim credits towards their own commitments, lowered rich countries' mitigation costs but risked delaying the transition to alternative forms of energy (Shue, 2014: 217-23) . Still, despite its many flaws, the Kyoto Protocol remains an outstanding success of solidarist ambition in international climate politics, especially when measured against the conservative standards of international diplomacy (Falkner, 2017 (Hochstetler and Milkoreit, 2014) . Action' failed to make any explicit reference to the UNFCCC norms of 'equity'
or 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. The combination of US power and intransigence had finally succeeded in shifting the international consensus away from Kyoto-style equity solutions. As Todd Stern, US Special Envoy on Climate Change, had made clear during the Durban conference, 'if equity's in, then we're out' (Pickering, et al., 2012 (Bulkeley, Edwards, et al., 2014) . These emerging approaches try to take into account structural inequalities and injustices that exist not just between nation-states but also within societies, and they also move beyond international distributional conflict towards questions of participation and recognition. They raise questions about how to apply the principle of differentiation to non-state actors, such as the fossil fuel industry, and how to account for the different responsibilities and contributions of the growing variety of actors involved in climate governance (Frumhoff and Heede, 2015) . The treaty's main innovation can be found in the move away from internationally negotiated emission targets towards a bottom-up structure of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) (Falkner, 2016) . This shift has allowed the international community to sidestep the thorny distributional conflict that had bedeviled the UNFCCC process for over two decades. The equity norm of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' had only established the vague principle that some form of differentiation was needed in dividing the global mitigation burden, but countries never managed to agree on a precise formula for translating this principle into quantified emission reduction targets for each and every country. In a world of shifting emissions profiles and contested notions of historical responsibility, the creators of the Paris Agreement opted for a more inclusive but voluntary approach that spreads mitigation responsibility widely while allowing each country to set its own emission targets. To balance this de-centralised approach with a certain degree of international accountability, the Paris Agreement also established an international framework for reviewing and revising national pledges on a five-yearly basis, with countries having to report on the implementation of their NDCs and increase the level of national ambition over time.
Redefining global climate justice: The new logic of the Paris Agreement
Given the profound shift in its underlying regulatory approach, the Paris Agreement was bound to raise a number of difficult questions for the climate justice agenda. Early concern focused on the omission of references to equity and differentiation in the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, which framed the negotiations on the Paris accord. At the insistence of developing countries, however, the CBDR norm was reinserted into the working draft for the treaty. Unsurprisingly, questions of equity loomed large over the entire negotiation process as developing countries tried to reintroduce a stronger justice dimension, fearful of the consequences for equity if Northern proposals for a more flexible and bottom-up model would be adopted. In the end, the preamble of the agreement included a reference to the 'concept of climate justice', although the added qualifier that it is important only 'for some' clearly signals its contested nature.
There can be little doubt that the treaty marks a profound shift in the way climate justice is approached in international climate politics. Whereas in the past the debate revolved around how to balance historical responsibilities with different economic circumstances in defining mitigation targets, the new bottom up structure avoids any attempt to resolve this core distributional conflict. Differentiation is still present as a guiding principle: the Paris Agreement accepts that emissions peaking will take longer for developing countries to achieve; acknowledges the special situation that the poorest countries find themselves in; and makes frequent reference to sustainable development and eradicating poverty as the context for defining the global response (Okereke and Coventry, 2016: 840) . But this does not alter Rajamani's (2012) assessment that differentiation has been 'on the wane' ever since it reached its zenith in the Kyoto Protocol.
The international climate regime has moved away from an internationally agreed formula for allocating fair and equitable mitigation burdens and instead leaves it to the Parties to define for themselves how they intend to meet their own interpretation of climate justice. It is now through a regular international review process that the international community seeks to subject national claims to equitable mitigation efforts to a transparent form of international scrutiny and contestation (Chan, 2016: 298) , potentially relying also on civil society groups to perform so-called 'equity reviews' as part of the Agreement's new deliberative process (Shue, 2018: x) . 2 Paris thus represents a weakening of the climate regime's substantive justice dimensions and a greater procedural focus on how to review and ratchet up nationally determined mitigation pledges.
To be sure, the international debate on climate justice has made some minor advances in other areas. Given that a certain degree of global warming is now inevitable and will result in rising sea levels and extreme weather patterns whatever mitigation efforts will be undertaken, developing countries have long demanded that climate change-related loss and damage should be Change Impacts at COP-19 in 2013 (Vanhala and Hestbaek, 2016: 112 To be sure, the notion of an eternal struggle between international order and global justice is far too simplistic to capture the complex reality of how normative claims have infused and shaped international climate politics. What we have witnessed in the negotiations leading to the Paris Agreement is not just a revision, and partial rejection, of established approaches to distributive justice, but also a reframing of the normative debate. This is in part about a move from negotiating global towards local justice solutions (Pottier, 2017) . It also signals the rise of a new procedural approach to embedding justice concerns in global climate governance, which engages a wider range of actors -states in first instance, but also firms and civil society groups -in ongoing struggles to review and revise national policy ambition.
By creating what could prove to be a politically more acceptable and robust regime, international society has also increased the chances of the remaining elements of climate justice to be implemented and expanded. And as the global transition towards a low-carbon economic future picks up speed and green energy sources become more readily available, some of the early distributional disputes, such as over subsistence emissions, may lose their 13 urgency. But this presumes that the low-carbon transition is proceeding at a sufficient pace and on a global scale, and that other distributional conflicts do not hold back the collective effort. Shue is therefore right to stand by his core claim that 'the politically crucial question of the fair sharing of burdens cannot be evaded and will not be forgotten' (Shue, 2018: xx) .
